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Abstract
We consider the pricing problem of a seller with delayed price information.
By using Lagrange duality, a dual problem is derived, and it is proved that
there is no duality gap. This gives a characterization of the seller’s price of
a contingent claim. Finally, we analyze the dual problem, and compare the
prices offered by two sellers with delayed and full information respectively.
Key words: Mathematical finance, Lagrange duality, delayed information,
pricing.
1 Introduction
We consider the pricing problem of a seller of a contingent claim B in a finan-
cial market with a finite scenario space Ω and a finite, discrete time setting.
The seller is assumed to have information modeled by a filtration (Gt)t which
is generated by a delayed price process, so the seller has delayed price informa-
tion. This delay of information is a realistic situation for many financial market
traders. Actually, traders may pay to get updated prices.
The seller’s problem is to find the smallest price of B, such that there is
no risk of her losing money. We solve this by deriving a dual problem via La-
grange duality, and use the linear programming duality theorem to show that
there is no duality gap. A related approach is that of King [7], where the fun-
damental theorem of mathematical finance is proved using linear programming
duality. Vanderbei and Pilar [15] also use linear programming to price American
warrants.
A central theorem of this paper is Theorem 3.1, which describes the seller’s
price of the contingent claim. This generalizes a pricing result by Delbaen and
Schachermayer to a delayed information setting (see [4], Theorem 5.7). Con-
trary to what one might guess, this characterization does not involve martingale
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measures. We can however get an idea of the seller’s price by comparing it to
that of an unconstrained seller, which is done in Section 4. As one would expect,
the seller with delayed information will offer B at a higher price than a seller
with full information.
Since the seller’s pricing problem is parallel to the buyer’s problem, of how
much she is willing to pay for the claim, the results will carry through analo-
gously for buyers. This implies that a buyer with delayed information is willing
to pay less for the claim than a buyer with full information. Hence, the prob-
ability of a seller and buyer with delayed information agreeing on a price is
smaller than that of fully informed agents.
This paper considers the case of finite Ω and discrete time. Although this is
not the most general situation, it is of practical use, since one often envisions
only a few possible world scenarios, and has a finite set of times where one
wants to trade. Also, for this and similar problems in mathematical finance,
discretization is necessary to find efficient computational methods.
There are many advantages to working with finite Ω and discrete time. The
information structure of an agent can be illustrated in a scenario tree, mak-
ing the information development easy to visualize. Conditions on adaptedness
and predictability, are greatly simplified. Adaptedness of a process to a fil-
tration means that the process takes one value in each vertex (node) of the
scenario tree representing the filtration. Moreover, the general linear program-
ming theory (see Vanderbei [14]) and Lagrange duality framework (see Bertsekas
et al. [1]) apply. This allows application of powerful theorems such as the lin-
ear programming duality theorem. Also, computational algorithms from linear
programming, such as the simplex algorithm and interior point methods, can be
used to solve the seller’s problem in specific situations. Note that the simplex
algorithm is not theoretically efficient, but works very well in practice. Interior
point methods, however, are both theoretically and practically efficient. Both
algorithms will work well in practical situations where one considers a reason-
able amount of possible world scenarios. Theoretically, they may nevertheless
be inadequate for a very large number of possible scenarios.
Those familiar with linear programming may wonder why Lagrange dual-
ity is used to derive the dual problem instead of standard linear programming
techniques. There are two important reasons for this. First of all, the Lagrange
duality approach provides better economic understanding of the dual problem
and allows for economic interpretations. Secondly, the Lagrange duality method
can be explained briefly, and Lagrange methods are familiar to most mathe-
maticians. Hence, using Lagrange duality makes this paper self-contained. The
reader does not have to be familiar with linear programming or other kinds of
optimization theory.
Other papers discussing the connection between mathematical finance and
duality methods in optimization are Pennanen [10], King [7], King and Korf [8]
and Pliska [12]. Pennanen [10] considers the connection between mathematical
finance and the conjugate duality framework of Rockafellar [13]. King [7] proves
the fundamental theorem of mathematical finance via linear programming dual-
ity, and King and Korf [8] derive a dual problem to the seller’s pricing problem
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via the conjugate duality theory of Rockafellar. Pliska [12] also uses linear pro-
gramming duality to prove that there exists a linear pricing measure if and only
if there are no dominant trading strategies.
Examples of papers considering models with different levels of information
in mathematical finance are Di Nunno et. al [5], Hu and Øksendal [6], Biagini
and Øksendal [2], Lakner [9] and Platen and Rungaldier [11].
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains
the setting. The financial market is defined, the use of scenario trees to model
filtrations is explained and the notation is introduced. Section A covers some
background theory, namely Lagrange duality. Section 3 analyzes the seller’s
pricing problem with partial information via Lagrange duality. This leads to
the central Theorem 3.1. In Section 4 we analyze the dual problem, and compare
the result of Theorem 3.1 with the price offered by a seller will full information.
This leads to Proposition 4.1. The final section, Section 5, concludes and poses
questions for further research.
2 The model
The financial market is modeled as follows. We are given a probability space
(Ω,F , P ) consisting of a finite scenario space, Ω = {ω1, ω2, . . . , ωM}, a
(σ-)algebra (here, there is no difference between σ-algebras and algebras since Ω
is finite) F on Ω and a probability measure P on the measurable space (Ω,F).
The financial market consists of N + 1 assets: N risky assets (stocks) and
one non-risky asset (a bond). The assets each have a price process Sn(t, ω),
n = 0, 1, . . . , N , for ω ∈ Ω and t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T} where T < ∞, and S0 denotes
the price process of the bond. The price processes Sn, n = 0, 1, . . . , N , are
stochastic processes. We denote by S(t, ω) := (S0(t, ω), S1(t, ω), . . . , SN (t, ω))
the vector in RN+1 consisting of the price processes of all the assets. For no-
tational convenience, we sometimes suppress the randomness, and write S(t)
instead of S(t, ω). Let (Ft)Tt=0 be the filtration generated by the price pro-
cesses. We assume that F0 = {∅,Ω} (so the prices at time 0, S(0), are de-
terministic) and FT is the algebra corresponding to the finest partition of Ω,
{{ω1}, {ω2}, . . . , {ωM}}.
We also assume that S0(t, ω) = 1 for all t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T}, ω ∈ Ω. This
corresponds to having divided through all the other prices by S0, and hence
turning the bank into the numeraire of the market. This altered market is a
discounted market. To simplify notation, the price processes in the discounted
market are denoted by S as well. Note that the stochastic process (Sn(t))Tt=0 is
adapted to the filtration (Ft)Tt=0.
Consider a contingent claim B, i.e., a non-negative, FT -measurable random
variable. B is a financial asset which may be traded in the market. Therefore,
consider a seller of the claim B. This seller has price information which is
delayed by one time step. We let (Gt)t be the filtration modelling the information
structure of the seller. Hence, we let G0 = {∅,Ω}, Gt = Ft−1 for t = 1, . . . , T −1
and GT = FT . These assumptions imply that at time 0 the seller knows nothing,
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while at time T the true world scenario is revealed. Note that since Ω is finite,
there is a bijection between partitions and algebras (the algebra consists of every
union of elements in the partition). The sets in the partition are called blocks.
One can construct a scenario-tree illustrating the situation, with the tree
branching according to the information partitions. Each vertex of the tree
corresponds to a block in one of the partitions. Each ω ∈ Ω represents a specific
development in time, ending up in the particular world scenario at the final time
T . Denote the set of vertices at time t by Nt, and let the vertices themselves
be indexed by v = v1, v2, . . . , vV .
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Figure 2.1: A scenario tree.
In the example illustrated in Figure 2.1, V = 8 and M = 5. The filtration
(Gt)t=0,1,2 corresponds to the partitions P1 = {Ω}, P2 = {{ω1, ω2}, {ω3, ω4, ω5}},
P2 = {{ω1}, {ω2}, . . . , {ω5}}.
Some more notation is useful. The parent a(v) of a vertex v is the unique ver-
tex a(v) preceding v in the scenario tree. Note that if v ∈ Nt, then a(v) ∈ Nt−1.
Every vertex, except the first one, has a parent. Each vertex v, except the termi-
nal vertices NT , have children vertices C(v). This is the set of vertices immedi-
ately succeeding the vertex v in the scenario tree. For each non-terminal vertex
v, the probability of ending up in vertex v is called pv, and pv =
∑
u∈C(v) pu.
Hence, from the original probability measure P , which gives probabilities to
each of the terminal vertices, one can work backwards, computing probabilities
for all the vertices in the scenario tree.
The adaptedness of the price process S to the filtration (Ft)t means that,
for each asset n, there is one value for the price Sn in each vertex of the scenario
tree. This value is denoted by Svn.
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Figure 2.2: Parent and children vertices in a scenario tree.
3 The pricing problem with partial information
Consider the model and the seller of Section 2, with T ≥ 4. Following the
same approach for a smaller T is not a problem, but requires different notation
and must therefore be considered separately. Hence, we consider a seller of a
contingent claim B who has price information that is delayed with one time
step. Recall that the seller’s filtration (Gt)t is such that G0 = {∅,Ω}, Gt = Ft−1
for t = 1, . . . , T − 1, GT = FT .
The pricing problem of this seller is
(3.1)
minimize κ
subject to
S0 ·H0 ≤ κ,
Bv ≤ Sv ·HaG(v) for all v ∈ N GT ,
SCG(v) ·Hv = SCG(v) ·HaG(v) for all v ∈ N Gt
and for all CG(v) ∈ N Gt+1,
t = 1, . . . , T − 2,
SCF (v) ·Hv = SCF (v) ·HaG(v) for all v ∈ N GT−1
and for all CF (v) ∈ NFT−1
where the minimization is done with respect to κ ∈ R and Hv ∈ R for v ∈ N Gt ,
for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1. Moreover, N Gt denotes the set of time t vertices in the
scenario tree representing the filtration G, and similarly for the filtration F . Bv
denotes the value of the claim B in the vertex v ∈ N GT (note that each v ∈ N GT
corresponds to an ω ∈ Ω). Also, aG(v) denotes the parent of vertex v w.r.t.
the filtration G (see Section 2). Similarly, CG(v) and CF (v) denote the children
vertices of vertex v w.r.t. G and F , respectively.
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Hence, the seller’s problem is: Minimize the price κ of the claim B such
that the seller is able to pay B at time T from investments in a self-financing,
G-adapted portfolio that costs less than or equal to κ at time 0. Note that
the feasibility constraints in problem (3.1) imply that the seller acts in a self-
financing matter w.r.t. the actual prices in the market. Let p˜ denote the seller’s
price of the claim B, so p˜ is the optimal value of problem (3.1). Problem (3.1)
is a linear programming problem. Hence, there are efficient algorithms, such as
the simplex algorithm or interior point methods, for solving problem (3.1), at
least if the scenario tree is not too large.
We determine the dual problem of (3.1), using Lagrange duality techniques.
In order to use the Lagrange duality method, rewrite the equality feasibility
constraints as two inequality constraints. Let y0 ≥ 0, zv ≥ 0 for all v ∈ N GT ,
y1v , y
2
v ≥ 0 for all v ∈ N Gt , for t = 2, 3 . . . , T − 1 and w1v, w2v ≥ 0 for all v ∈ N T−1F
be the Lagrange dual variables. Let z denote the vector of all the zv’s and
similarly yi wi the vector of all the yiv’s and wiv’s for i = 1, 2. Then, the
Lagrange dual problem is
supy0,z,y1,y2,w1,w2≥0 infκ,H{κ+ y0(S0 ·H0 − κ) +
∑
v∈NGT zv(Bv − Sv ·HaG(v))
+
∑T−2
t=1
∑
v∈NGt
∑
u∈CG(v)(y
1
u − y2u)Su∆Hv
+
∑
v∈NFT−2
∑
u∈CF (v)(w
1
u − w2u)Su ·∆Hv}
= supy0,z≥0,y,w {infκ{κ(1− y0)}+ infH0{H0 · (y0S0 −
∑
u∈CG(1) yuSu)}
+
∑T−3
t=1
∑
v∈NGt infHv{Hv ·
∑
u∈CG(v)(yuSu
−∑µ∈CG(u) yµSµ)}+∑v∈NGT−2 infHv{Hv ·∑u∈CG(v)(yuSu
−∑µ∈CF (u) wµSµ)}+∑v∈NGT−1 infHv{Hv·
(
∑
u∈CF (v) wuSu −
∑
u∈CG(v) zuSu)}+
∑
v∈NGT zvBv}
where yv := y1v − y2v and wv := w1v −w2v are free variables, ∆Hv := Hv −HaG(v)
and we have exploited that the Lagrange function is separable.
Consider each of the minimization problems separately. In order to have
a feasible dual solution, all of these minimization problems must have optimal
value greater than −∞:
• infκ{κ(1 − y0)} > −∞ if and only if y0 = 1. In this case, the infimum is
0.
• infH0{H0·(y0S0−
∑
u∈CG(1) yuSu)} > −∞ if and only if y0S0 =
∑
u∈CG(1) yuSu.
In this case, the infimum is 0.
• Note that
inf
Hv
{Hv ·
∑
u∈CG(v)
(yuSu −
∑
µ∈CG(u)
yµSµ)} > −∞
if and only if
∑
u∈CG(v)(yuSu −
∑
µ∈CG(u) yµSµ) = 0. Therefore, in order
to get a dual solution, this must hold for all v ∈ N Gt for t = 1, 2, . . . , T −3.
In this case, the infima are 0.
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• Furthermore, infHv{Hv ·
∑
u∈CG(v)(yuSu−
∑
µ∈CF (u) wµSµ)} > −∞ if and
only if
∑
u∈CG(v)(yuSu −
∑
µ∈CF (u) wµSµ) = 0. Again, in this case, the
infimum is 0.
• Finally, infHv{Hv ·(
∑
u∈CF (v) wuSu−
∑
u∈CG(v) zuSu)} > −∞ if and only if∑
u∈CF (v) wuSu =
∑
u∈CG(v) zuSu. Hence, this must hold for all v ∈ N GT−1.
In this case the infimum is 0.
Hence, the dual problem is
(3.2)
supy0,z≥0,y,w
∑
v∈NGT zvBv
subject to
y0 = 1,
y0S0 =
∑
u∈CG(1) yuSu,∑
u∈CG(v)(yuSu −
∑
µ∈CG(u) yµSµ) = 0 for all v ∈ N Gt , t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 3,∑
u∈CG(v)(yuSu −
∑
µ∈CF (u) wµSµ) = 0 for all v ∈ N GT−2,∑
u∈CF (v) wuSu =
∑
u∈CG(v) zuSu for all v ∈ N GT−1.
Note that the dual feasibility conditions are vector equations. From the lin-
ear programming duality theorem, see Vanderbei [14], there is no duality gap.
Hence, the optimal value of problem (3.1) equals the optimal value of prob-
lem (3.2).
By analyzing the dual feasibility conditions, we can remove the variable w
and rewrite problem (3.2) so that it is expressed using the filtration (Ft)t:
(3.3)
supy0,z≥0,y
∑
v∈NGT zvBv
subject to
y0 = 1,
y0S0 =
∑
u∈CF (0) yuSu,∑
u∈CF (v)(yuSu −
∑
µ∈CF(u) yµSµ) = 0 for all v ∈ NFt ,
t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 4,∑
u∈CF (v)(yuSu −
∑
µ∈CF (u)
∑
γ∈CF (µ) zγSγ) = 0 for all v ∈ NFT−3.
It is difficult to interpret problem (3.3) in its present form. It turns out that
we can rewrite this problem slightly so that it is easier to understand. Note that
(3.4)
∑
v∈NFT
zvSv =
∑
u∈NF1
yuSu = y0S0
where the first equality follows from using the dual feasibility conditions in-
ductively, and summing over all vertices at each time. Equation (3.4) is a
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vector equation. Since the market is normalized, the first component of the
price process vector is 1 at each time t. Hence, equation (3.4) implies that∑
v∈NFt zv = y0 = 1 where the final equality uses the first dual feasibility condi-
tion. Recall that z is non-negative from problem (3.3). Hence, z can be identified
with a probability measure on the terminal vertices of the scenario tree. Denote
this probability measure by Q. Then, problem (3.3) can be rewritten
(3.5)
supQ,y EQ[B]
subject to
(i) S0 =
∑
u∈CF (0) yuSu,
(ii)
∑
u∈CF (v)(yuSu −
∑
µ∈CF (u) yµSµ) = 0 for v ∈ NFt , t = 0, . . . , T − 4,
(iii)
∑
u∈CF (v) yuSu =
∑
u∈CF (v)
∑
µ∈CF (u)
∑
γ∈CF (µ) qγSγ
for v ∈ NFT−3
where Q is a probability measure and qγ denotes the Q-probability of ending
up in vertex γ at time T .
The dual problem is to maximize the expectation of the contingent claim
B over a set of probability measures, and some constraints regarding the price
process and a free variable y. However, there is no martingale measure interpre-
tation of the dual problem. Let d˜ denote the optimal value of the transformed
dual problem (3.5).
The previous derivation gives us the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 Consider a seller of a contingent claim B who has partial infor-
mation in the sense that her price information is delayed by one time step. Let
(Ft)t denote the filtration generated by the price process S. Then, p˜ = d˜, i.e.
the seller’s price of B is equal to the optimal value of problem (3.5).
Note that for a specific problem, one can solve problem (3.5) using the
simplex algorithm or interior point methods (for a reasonably sized scenario
tree). Also, the same kind of argument as above can be done from the buyer’s
point of view, yielding dual problem similar to problem (3.5), but with infimum
instead of the supremum.
4 Some comments on the dual problem
4.1 Connection to full information
From Delbaen and Schachermayer [4] (or a derivation similar to that of Sec-
tion 3), we know that the seller’s price of B with full information is
(4.1) α := sup
Q∈M(S,F)
EQ[B]
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where M(S,F) denotes the set of equivalent martingale measures w.r.t. the
filtration (Ft)t. In the following, assume there exists a Q ∈M(S,F). From [4],
this means that there is no arbitrage in the market.
Theorem 4.1 The difference between the price of B offered by a seller with
delayed information and a seller with full information is
(4.2) d˜− α ≥ 0.
Proof. From the definition of d˜ and α, it suffices to prove that each Q ∈
M(S,F) corresponds to a solution y, Q˜ of problem (3.5). Hence, let Q ∈
M(S,F). Define Q˜ := Q, and for each v ∈ NFT−1, define yv :=
∑
u∈CF (v) q˜u.
Similarly, for each v ∈ NFT−2, define yv :=
∑
u∈CF (v) yu. Iteratively, we define
yv :=
∑
u∈CF (v) yu for each v ∈ NFt , t = 0, . . . , T − 3. We would like to show
that Q˜, y are feasible for problem (3.5).
(i) : Since Q ∈ M(S,F), S0 = EQ[S1|F0], which from the definition of
conditional expectation implies (i).
(ii) : Q ∈M(S,F) implies that EQ[St+1|Ft] = St. Hence, from the definition
of conditional expectation, yuSu =
∑
µ∈CF (u) yµSµ for all u ∈ NFt , so (ii)
holds.
(iii) : Again, since Q ∈M(S,F), EQ[ST |FT−2] = ST−2. Hence,
yuSu =
∑
µ∈CF (u)
∑
γ∈CF (µ) qγSγ , so (iii) holds.
Hence, the theorem follows. 
The difference in Theorem 4.1 can be computed for specific examples.
Theorem 4.1 implies that, as one would expect, the seller with only partial
information will demand a higher price for B than a fully informed seller. As
in Section 3, the same kind of argument goes through for a buyer of the claim.
Hence, the probability of a seller and buyer agreeing on a price of the claim is
smaller in a market with delayed information, than in the fully informed case.
4.2 A closer bound
We can find an interpretable problem which has optimal value closer to that of
problem (3.5) than the full information problem (4.1). Consider the following
optimization problem
(4.3)
supQ EQ[B]
subject to
S0 = EQ[S1],
EQ[St+1|Ft] = EQ[St+2|Ft] for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 4,
EQ[ST−2|FT−3] = EQ[ST |FT−3].
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Let β denote the the optimal value of problem (4.3).
Theorem 4.2 The optimal value of problem (4.3) lies between the price of B
offered by the seller with full information and the price offered by the seller with
delayed information, i.e.,
α ≤ β ≤ d˜
Proof. Clearly, α ≤ β, from the definition of M(S,F).
It remains to prove that β ≤ d˜. Hence, consider Q feasible in problem (4.3).
It suffices to prove that Q corresponds to a feasible solution Q˜, y for prob-
lem (3.5). Define Q˜ and y as in the proof of Proposition 4.1. We check the
feasibility constraints of problem (3.5).
(i) : Since Q is feasible in (4.3), S0 = EQ[S1]. Hence, from the definition of
conditional expectation, S0 =
∑
u∈CF (0) yuSu.
(ii) : Again, since Q is feasible in (4.3), EQ[St+1|Ft] = EQ[St+2|Ft] for t =
0, 1, . . . , T −4. From the definition of conditional expectation, this implies
that
∑
u∈CF (v)(yuSu−
∑
µ∈CF (u) yµSµ) = 0 for all v ∈ NFt , t = 0, . . . , T−4.
Hence, (ii) holds.
(iii) : (iii) follows similarly from the feasibility of Q in (4.3) and the definition
of conditional expectation.
Hence, β ≤ d˜. 
5 Final remarks
A main idea of this paper has been to illustrate the close connection between
pricing problems in mathematical finance and duality methods in optimization.
The results of this paper can actually be generalized to a model with arbi-
trary scenario space Ω by using the conjugate duality theory of Rockafellar [13].
This is a work in progress.
Some questions open for further research are:
• Can these results be generalized to a model with continuous time, possibly
using a discrete time approximation?
• Is it possible to characterize the partially informed seller’s dual problem
more explicitly?
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A Lagrange duality
This section reviews some basic ideas and results concerning Lagrange dual-
ity which will be useful in the following. For more on Lagrange duality and
optimization theory, see Bertsekas et al. [1].
Let X be a general inner product space with inner product 〈·, ·〉. Consider
a function f : X → R and the very general optimization problem
(A.1) minimize f(x) subject to g(x) ≤ 0, x ∈ S
where g is a function such that g : X → Rn and S is a non-empty subset of X.
Here, g(x) ≤ 0 means component-wise inequality. This will be called the primal
problem.
Define the Lagrange function, L(x, λ), for λ ∈ Rn, λ ≥ 0 (component-wise),
to be
L(x, λ) = f(x) + λ · g(x).
where (·) denotes Euclidean inner product.
Then, for all x ∈ X such that g(x) ≤ 0 (component-wise) and all λ ∈ Rn, λ ≥
0, we have L(x, λ) ≤ f(x). This motivates the definition L(λ) := infx∈S L(x, λ)
for all λ ≥ 0 (note that L(λ) = −∞ is possible), and the Lagrange dual problem
sup
λ≥0
L(λ).
This gives the following result called weak Lagrange duality.
Proposition A.1
sup{L(λ) : λ ≥ 0} ≤ inf{f(x) : g(x) ≤ 0, x ∈ S}.
Hence, the Lagrange dual problem gives the greatest lower bound on the
optimal value of problem (A.1), based on L. Often the Lagrange dual problem is
separable, and therefore fairly easy to solve. For some problems, one can proceed
to show duality theorems, proving that supλ≥0 L(λ) = inf{f(x) : g(x) ≤ 0, x ∈
S}. In this case, one says that there is no duality gap. This typically occurs
in convex optimization problems under certain assumptions. For instance, the
linear programming duality theorem (see Vanderbei [14]) may be derived using
Lagrange duality.
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